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We present results of opinion dynamics simulations based on the emotion/information/opinion
(E/I/O) model, applied to a strongly polarized society. Under certain conditions the model leads
to metastable coexistence of two subcommunities (supporting each of the opinions) of comparable
size – which corresponds to bipartisan split found in many real world communities. Spurred by the
recent breakdown of such system, which existed in Poland for over 9 years, we extend the model by
allowing a third opinion. We show that if the propaganda messages of the two incumbent parties
differ in emotional tone, the system may be “invaded” by a newcomer third party very quickly – in
qualitative agreement with the actual political situation in Poland in 2015.
I. INTRODUCTION
Studies of opinion changes in societies are part of the
core of topics of sociophysics. One of the reasons is the
importance of understanding of changes in public atti-
tudes versus specific issues or policies. There are many
approaches, differing in the description of the available
opinion states, interpersonal dynamics, network descrip-
tion and many others. Among the most popular, one can
mention the voter model [1–4], the Sznajd model [5–12],
the bounded confidence model [13–18], the Hegelsmann-
Krause model [19], the social impact model of Nowak-
Latane´ [20, 21] and its further modifications [22–25].
In a series of previously published papers [26–28] we
have introduced a model that combines the dynamics of
individual opinion and emotion changes. In the current
work we use a modified version of the model (introducing
a possibility of three opinions, corresponding to three
political parties) to attempt a description of the recent
changes on the Polish political scene.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes
shortly the Polish political situation. Section III de-
scribes shortly the model while Section IV focuses on
the introduced modifications. Section V describes the
results of the model and the dependence on the parame-
ters. Section VI provides a discussion of the results and
possible developments of the situation for the upcoming
parliamentary elections and afterwards.
II. POLITICAL SITUATION IN POLAND
During the 25 years since the overthrow of the com-
munist rule, Poland has had a quite active political his-
tory. With a single exception in 2011, every parliamen-
tary election brought a radical change in the landscape
of political parties and the ruling coalition. The elec-
tion rules were changed profoundly: initially they allowed
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people to vote for candidates representing multiple par-
ties; later they changed to votes for one party, in a pro-
portional system with rather high threshold of 5%. This
later change was coupled with a growing polarization of
the political scene (and the whole society), which has
led eventually to a dominance of two parties: Platforma
Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform) and Prawo i Spraw-
iedliwos´c´ (PiS, Law and Justice). It is rather interesting,
that in the parliamentary elections in 2005 which brought
the two parties to the dominant positions at the expense
of the leftist parties, the election campaign was based
on the promise of a joint government, with the unofficial
acronym POPiS. This was considered by many voters
to be a very attractive political idea, and subsequently,
the two parties got 28.91% and 33.70% of the votes, re-
spectively. No other party received more than 13% of
the votes. Yet shortly after the elections a conflict be-
tween the leaders of the two parties broke out, and the
promised coalition never happened, leaving a part of the
electorate dubbed “POPiS orphans”. The government
was formed by PiS, led by Mr Jaros law Kaczyn´ski, in
coalition with two smaller parties. This proved unten-
able, and in early elections in 2007 due to the crisis, it
was PO that captured the majority (41.51%), while PiS
has became a strong opposition, with 32.11% of votes.
This result was repeated in the next parliamentary elec-
tions in 2011, which was won by PO (39.18%) with PiS
receiving 29.89% of the votes.
Since 2005 until 2014, the two parties have enjoyed a
virtual dominance on the Polish political scene, as doc-
umented not only by the results of the parliamentary
elections but also the presidential ones, elections to the
European Parliament and local elections. It is also con-
firmed by the data from popularity polls, which show
practically stable, high level support for the two domi-
nant parties with a stable or decreasing popularity of the
minor parties. The stability is even more visible if one
adds to the results of PiS the figures for two smaller par-
ties: PJN and SP, which have split off from PiS in 2011
and 2012, due to personal differences, keeping a very sim-
ilar political program and addressing the same electoral
base. The two parties merged back with PiS in 2014.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
7.
00
12
6v
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  1
1 J
ul 
20
15
2There are multiple explanations for the duopoly that
emerged in Poland in 2005. On one level, it is quite illu-
minating to consider the map of voter preferences, which
shows remarkably stable pattern of support, roughly cor-
responding to historical boundaries of Polish partitions
in 19th century. Such geographical division of prefer-
ences corresponds to deeper cultural patterns, which will
not be discussed in this work. We note that the changes
in the voting results take the form of gradual shifts of
the dominance in the constituencies, as shown in Fig-
ure 1. This pattern justifies, to a certain extent, the use
of a simple two-dimensional topology for the agent based
model.
Another reason for the stability, in our opinion the cru-
cial one, is the capturing of the public debate by the two
parties. Ever since the elections of 2005, the would-be
coalition partners started an aggressive fight, leading to
a very strong polarization of the Polish population and
media. Much of the emotional content was focused on
personal differences between the leaders of the two par-
ties: Mr jaros law Kaczyn´ski and Mr Donald Tusk, the
leader of PO. Such polarization has left very little room
for any other political option/party – phenomenon known
in other countries (e.g. the Democrat/Republican split
in the US political scene). The public campaigns of both
parties focused on negative emotions, accusations, fear of
what would happen if ‘they’ win, etc. This aggressive-
ness has increased, especially on the part of PiS , since the
crash of the plane carrying the Polish President, Mr Lech
Kaczyn´ski (twin brother of the PiS leader) near Smolensk
in Russia in April 2010. In the subsequent presidential
elections of 2010, Mr Jaros law Kaczyn´ski (who stepped in
to continue his brother legacy) lost to the PO candidate,
Mr Bronis law Komorowski. In this way PO has achieved
full control of the government structures: parliament ma-
jority with a single coalition partner, government and the
presidential office (but short of of reaching the capacity
to change the constitution).
The tragic plane crash and the lost elections have sig-
nificantly increased the negative tone of the PiS commu-
nications with the electorate. In addition to the typical
(for a political opposition) criticism of mis-management
of the country, a significant part of the message focused
on accusations that the plane crash was, in fact, a result
of some sort of a plot, and that the plane was destroyed
by a mid-air explosion. Implicitly, the PiS propaganda
indicated Russia as the culprit, but the direct target was
the PO government, either as acting in collusion with
the perpetrators of the attack, or, in the least aggres-
sive case, as grossly incompetent in handling of the crash
investigation.
The increasing conflict and the personal attacks be-
tween politicians representing the two camps resulted in
an increasingly polarized society. Moreover, the polariza-
tion covers also the media outlets: there are TV stations,
daily journals, weeklies and WEB portals that cover al-
most exclusively a single viewpoint. There is strong ten-
dency to limit the range of the media used by the sup-
FIG. 1. Evolution of the local community voter preferences
in Polish parliamentary elections in 2005 (top), 2007 (middle)
and 2011 (bottom). Source: Robert Wielgo´rski (Barry Kent)
to be found under https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wybory
parlamentarne w Polsce.
3FIG. 2. Evolution of the support for major political parties in Poland 2010–2014. PO and PiS are the main contenders,
while SLD (socialdemocrats) and PSL (peasants party) are smaller ones, existing on the scene during the whole 25 year post-
communist era, with small but well entrenched core electoral base. The data on PiS group them together with two other parties,
PJN and SP, which have split-off from PiS during the period, but which have since returned to form a single political entity
in late 2014. As the three parties address the same electorate with very similar propositions, we treat them together in the
polls analysis. Since 2007, PSL is the coalition partner of PO. TR (Ruch Palikota/Twoj Ruch) is a party formed in mid-2011
by a PO dissident, which has enjoyed a brief period of success between 2011 and 2012. Data from Mr Maciej Witkowiak,
http://niepewnesondaze.blogspot.com/.
porters of each political camp to the outlets representing
the same views, and to describe the other channels as
traitorous or trash.
The aggressively negative communications by PiS is in
stark contrast with the communication strategy chosen
by PO. For example, the government has been very late in
mounting an information campaign countering the con-
spiracy theories of the Smolensk crash embraced by PiS.
Relying on the results of the official investigations, the
messages were long delayed, and lacked the emotional
appeal. At the same time, shortly after the presiden-
tial elections in 2010, Mr Tusk declared that “as long
as he is active in public life, he prefers, what some mis-
chievous commentators call warm water in the tap pol-
icy” [29]. Most of the communication strategy of PO fo-
cused on the achievements of the government and country
as a whole, its economic growth, new infrastructure such
as highways, etc. It should be noted here, that during
the period in which PO was in power, Poland has in-
deed enjoyed significant benefits of the EU membership
and has weathered the economic crisis with remarkable
success, being the only country to preserve continuous
growth of GDP (dubbed “green island” by the PO gov-
ernment). Thus the “success” focused communications
did have some real background. But they did not evoke
emotional interest and commitment on the part of the
PO supporters comparable to the effects of the negative
campaign of PiS. Following the election of Mr Tusk to
the post of the President of the European Council in late
2014, PO has focused even more its media campaign on
the positive image “all is well” messages, clearly ignoring
the increasing signs of dissatisfaction and demobilization
of their own electoral base. Even so, the local elections
held in November 2014 resulted in a tie between PO and
PiS, with a very strong result for the PO coalition partner
PSL.
4FIG. 3. Evolution of the support for presidential candidates
of PO (Mr Komorowski) and PiS (Mr Duda) in the 2015 pres-
idential elections, including the support for the independent
candidate, Mr Kukiz. The final (larger) points indicate the
results of the first round of voting in the presidential elections.
Data from various polls, via Wikipedia.
Again, the reaction to these results was very differ-
ent in the government camp (which has declared yet an-
other victory), and PiS, which openly claimed the elec-
tions to be manipulated and the results rigged. It is no
surprise that the emotional response in the aftermath of
the elections was very different as well: while the PO vot-
ers mostly did not take much notice, the PiS electorate
was actively mobilized and formed many “spontaneous”
initiatives “to protect future elections”.
The long period of relative stability of the PO-PiS
duopoly described above seems to be broken by an emer-
gence of a third power with comparable political support,
as shown by the events related to the recent presidential
elections held in May-June 2015. The initial polls, in
January 2015, have indicated a landslide victory of the
incumbent president, Mr Komorowski (with over 60%
support, allowing to win in the first round of voting).
The expectation of an easy win was further enhanced by
the choice of a candidate by PiS (instead of the party
leader, Mr Jaros law Kaczyn´ski, the party has chosen as
its candidate Mr Andrzej Duda, almost unknown to the
general public). A lackluster campaign by the incum-
bent has led to a steady decrease of the support, while
the support for Mr Duda has grown significantly. Even-
tually Mr Duda won the first round (gathering 34.76%
of the votes, compared to 33.77% for Mr Komorowski)
and the second round (albeit by a rather narrow margin
51.55/48.45%). At the same time, the polls conducted in
May and June 2015, ahead of the parliamentary elections
(to be held in late 2015) show a significant and increasing
lead of PiS over PO, reversing the order of the support
present in the past decade, mostly due to the dramatic
drop in the PO support. It should be noted here, that
the external campaign of Mr Duda was much more toned
down and focused on his image as a rational, future ori-
ented politician, rather than the typical PiS aggressive
messages.
What is the most interesting phenomenon, which has
prompted this particular work, was an apparent break-
down of the political duopoly. An independent can-
didate, Mr Pawe l Kukiz (rockman, who previosly has
not been much active in politics). His campaign, which
started almost two months after the main rivals’, lacked
significant funding, but has focused the attention of the
dissatisfied, especially the young part of the popula-
tion. Based on a single battle cry for single-member con-
stituencies (such a change from the current proportional
system would require changes in the Polish constitution),
Mr Kukiz appealed to all the dissatisfied with the current
party system. In the space of a few months he has gath-
ered an enormous support, getting 20.8% of the votes in
the first round of the elections (see Figure 3). After the
elections, a wider movement coalesced around Mr Kukiz,
becoming the third political power as measured by the
polls in early summer 2015. Mr Kukiz continues to push
for the single-member constituencies and the parliamen-
tary elections, scheduled for October 2015.
Achieving popularity at the level of two thirds of the
support for the mainstream candidates by an unknown
candidate is a phenomenon that can not only change
the future of Polish politics (which remains to be seen)
but also requires an in-depth scientific study. While sta-
ble duopolies have already been studied via agent based
models, the sudden breakdown of such situation provides
and interesting challenge. In our work we aim to provide
a simple agent based model, which shows, in a single con-
ceptual frame, both the previous stable duopoly and its
recent breakdown, along with some possible future sce-
narios.
III. GENERAL MODEL DESCRIPTION
Our goal is to present an agent based model that
would be simple enough to understand intuitively, yet
which would be based more closely on psychological un-
derstanding of human behavior than the standard ap-
proaches. Part of the motivation comes from extended
studies of the behavior of the users of Internet fora related
to the Polish politics between 2009 and 2011, where we
have observed strong correlations between the expressed
opinions and emotions of the participants [30–32]. No-
tably, we have observed that when the emotional arousal
of the participants is high, their capacity to change opin-
ions is negligibly small. This observation has led us
to propose an approach in which the individual opinion
about a specific issue would be influenced by a combi-
nation of the information related to the matter and the
emotional state of the person.
The current paper is based on the model introduced in
5FIG. 4. Evolution of the support for major political parties in Poland in 2015. The data for Mr Kukiz party (which started to
get recognized in the polls since June 2015) is spliced with his personal support in the presidential elections, shown in Figure 3.
Due to the nature of the movement, based largely on the personality of the leader, we think such data use is permissible. Data
from Mr Maciej Witkowiak, http://niepewnesondaze.blogspot.com/.
[26] and [27], in which the model is described in consid-
erable detail. The structure of the model combines “mi-
croscopic” description of individual opinion change with
a flexible communication mechanism, allowing to use the
model in different social contexts. The proposed solu-
tion is based on a simplification of the catastrophe the-
ory of behavior, which has been introduced more than
30 years ago [33], and had been used (and criticized)
in analyses of human behavior (for a review see [34]).
The cusp catastrophe model allows to describe situations
where the same amount of information that would lead
to an opinion change for low emotional state would leave
the agent’s opinion unchanged for high value of the emo-
tional arousal. While the catastrophe theory has been
used in description of the individual behavior, it is not
well suited for large scale opinion simulations. This is
because the continuous nature of the control variables
makes it very difficult to correctly map the model and
psychological observations and then to assign these val-
ues to computer based agent societies – there is simply
too much variability in the starting conditions and sys-
tem evolution.
For this reason we have proposed [26, 27] a discrete
version of the approach, in which the continuous folded
cusp surface is replaced by just seven states correspond-
ing to two values of the emotion level (splitting factor):
calm and agitated and three values for the information
and opinion: pro, contra and neutral. This can be eas-
ily transformed to descriptions of support for political
parties, especially in a duopoly situation.
We are using an approach based on communication via
discrete messages. Such message – originating from an-
other agent or from the press, TV, the Internet or other
media – would be described by exactly the same set of
variables as the recipient agent: emotional arousal level,
information and opinion. In the case of messages sent by
an agent, the characteristics of the message are assumed
to equal those of the authoring agent. The use of discrete
states allows a simple description of behavior of an indi-
vidual agent resulting from contact with another member
of the society or with an external information/emotion
source.
Upon receiving a message (which means either inter-
acting with another agent or with media carrying some
propaganda messages), the recipient state may, in some
cases, be modified. Generally, the model assumes that
agents in calm states are capable of changing their opin-
ion, if they receive information contrary to their current
beliefs (calm stale allows rational processing of such in-
formation leading to change of the opinion). On the other
hand, agitated agents, even exposed to contrary informa-
tion, would preserve their opinion unchanged, refusing
to accept /process the messages in a rational way. Thus,
within the model, the only way to make an agitated agent
change its opinion is first via calming it down (which may
happen if the agent is in contact with calm messages or
6agents with which it is in agreement), and only then by
changing the opinion by contact with messages or agents
with an opposing view. In addition to the “calming” pro-
cesses, a reverse process in which a calm agent exposed
to contrary view may become agitated (without chang-
ing the opinion). This happens with a probability pagit
when the contact is with a calm opponent/message and
with a 100% probability if the opponent is agitated.
These basic rules correspond to simplified, intuitive
psychological description of opinion change of a person,
dependent on the current opinion and emotional state of
that person, as well as on the state of the person with
whom the interaction occurs, again, both the opinion and
the emotions.
As already mentioned in the current scenario we con-
sider both direct interactions between agents and global
messages. The latter are generated with specific opin-
ions and end emotions (corresponding to the propaganda
strategy of the political parties), issued with pre-fixed
frequency. The reception of the agents to these messages
depends on the agreement or disagreement between the
agent in question and the message, reflecting the phe-
nomenon of selective attention known from social psy-
chology [35, 36].
The combination of the individual opinion and emo-
tion dynamics and the message based communication al-
gorithm has been already used to describe, in a quantita-
tive way, the properties of a discussion forum, including
the ratios of expressed emotions, opinions, types of mes-
sages (agreements, disagreements, trolling etc.) [28].
IV. SPECIFIC SIMULATION CONDITIONS
In the current approach we aimed at qualitative de-
scription of the real political situation. For this reason,
in the following discussion, we will be using the names of
the actual parties and political movements, rather than
rely on abstract notation. This should facilitate the com-
parison between the model and the political situation de-
scribed in Section II, especially for non-Polish readers. It
should be noted that the use of this shorthand notation
does not mean either support or lack of support on the
part of the author for any of the parties mentioned.
The two-opinion model used in the previous works may
be easily extended to a larger number of exclusive opin-
ions. In our case, considering three parties (two major
contenders and a newcomer), instead of the seven states
corresponding to the two party situation, there are 10
states: one global neutral and three states for each party.
However, all the basic rules of the individual opinion dy-
namics remain the same.
To describe the interactions between the agents we
have chosen a simple 2D square geometry, as described in
[27]. This allows us to visualize the evolution of the opin-
ions. The system starts in a neutral state, with a small,
randomly placed admixture of ‘seed’ agents representing
the two parties: PO and PiS. This admixture is at the
FIG. 5. A snapshot of the system configuration at T = 199 –
just before the PO and PIS propaganda messages are switched
on. This time corresponds to the evolved starting conditions
(T1). Light blue: calm PiS supporters; dark blue: agitated
PiS supporters; orange: calm PO supporters; red: agitated
PO supporters. The spatial separation of the support base is
reminiscent to the geographical patterns shown in Figure 1.
Agitated agents are localized at the boundaries of the “party
held” domains.
level of ∼1%. We have allowed only short range inter-
actions between the agents, in the Moore neighborhood.
In the absence of media messages, the system evolves
to stable domains of shared opinions. Within these do-
mains, agents are surrounded by neighbors sharing the
same opinion, so their emotional state becomes calm. Ag-
itation occurs at the boundaries between these domains.
Such situation may be seen in Figure 5. This stage of the
simulation ends at the time T1, and may be considered a
system preparation phase, in which the social division is
created, so that the state at T1 is a ‘true’ starting condi-
tion. In the presented simulations T1 = 200 Monte Carlo
steps per agent.
Small modifications of the initial number of seeds rep-
resenting PO and PiS lead to different ratios of support-
ers of the two parties at T1. Up to this moment the sys-
tem dynamics is fully symmetric between the two parties,
and the final configuration at T1 depends on the initial
seed ratios.
A. Treatment of party propaganda
The treatment of the propaganda messaging in the sys-
tem is the crucial development of the current work. These
messages differ from the agent-to-agent messaging in sev-
eral ways.
First, the propaganda is divided into the categories of
“internal” (addressed to the party supporters) and “ex-
ternal” (addressed outside the current support base. The
7internal propaganda may take two forms: “mobilizing”
(aimed at increasing the emotional commitment of the
supporters, transitioning them from the calm into the
agitated state); and “demobilizing”, which act in the op-
posite way: they make the agitated agents calm, and on
top of that, they make the calm agents bored, turning
them into the neutral state. As one can guess, this divi-
sion is intended to mimic the main propaganda strategies
of PiS and PO.
The external propaganda comes again in two types:
“rational” – aimed at converting neutral agents into the
party supporters, and, additionally, converting calm sup-
porters of other parties into neutral agents via rational
argumentation. The latter effect may backfire, as with
some probability pagit the agent receiving the message
may become angered by it and turn from its calm state
to an agitated one (just like the effects of an encounter
between two calm agents supporting different parties).
The value of pagit was set at 0.2 in the simulations. The
“irrational” messages are, in a sense, a spillover from
the internal mobilizing propaganda, and their effect is
twofold: they change neutral agents directly to the agi-
tated supporters, but they turn calm opponents into ag-
itated opponents.
The ratios of the various types of propaganda allow to
model the actual behavior of he parties. Once the pro-
paganda is switched on, that is after T1, the Pratio pa-
rameter determines the ratio of the propaganda messages
to the total number of messages an agent receives on the
average, in the simulations we have used Pratio = 0.8, i.e.
80% of messages received by an agent resulted from the
propaganda (his own party and other parties), while 20%
were results of the interactions with the closest neighbors.
The ratios of various propaganda messages at this stage
are presented in Table I.
At T1 both major parties “switch on” their propaganda
machines. Until T2 = 800 MC steps per agent, the polit-
ical status quo is reproduced, with most of the PO sup-
porters within their domains remaining calm, while most
of the PiS supporters within their domains are turned
into the agitated state. A typical snapshot of such situ-
ation is shown in Figure 6.
Provided we limit ourselves to short range interactions
between the agents, for a large range of the parameters
the system quickly reaches a meta-stable state, as noted
in [27]. This state would correspond to the long period
of the duopoly between PO and PiS in the actual Polish
politics, as shown in Figure 2.
At T2 the third party enters the political scene, with a
mixture of internal and external propaganda messages.
The parameters for this stage are shown in Table II.
Thanks to the asymmetry in the system state just be-
fore T2, the reception of the Kukiz-oriented propaganda
is vastly different for the PiS and PO agents. It quickly
gains support within the receptive PO dominated areas,
while receiving practically no response in the PiS do-
mains (Figure 7). In fact, at the same time PiS makes
significant inroads into the areas dominated previously
FIG. 6. A snapshot of the system configuration at T = 600
– when the effects of the PO and PiS propaganda are well
set in. Almost all PiS agents are agitated, while PO domains
remain relatively calm.
FIG. 7. A snapshot of the system configuration at T = 1000
– 100 time steps after Kukiz propaganda started. The agi-
tated PiS agents are largely immune to it, while the previ-
ously calm PO domains become invaded by Kukiz support-
ers. Light green: calm Kukiz supporters; dark green: agitated
Kukiz supporters.
by PO, weakened by the Kukiz “invasion”.
Eventually, only a small number of agitated PO sup-
porters remain, their initial numbers ‘eaten’ from within
by Kukiz supporters and from outside by PiS ones (Fig-
ure 8
It is quite interesting to compare the model process for
the invasion of support for the newcoming party shown in
Figures 6 and 9 with the actual distribution of voter sup-
port for Mr Kukiz in the presidential elections, shown in
Figure 10. As expected, the highest support for Mr Kukiz
8FIG. 8. An example of the evolution of the support for the
three political camps. Top panel: calm and agitated sup-
porters; orange – calm PO agents, red – agitated PO agents;
light blue – calm PiS agents, dark blue – agitated PiS agents;
light green – calm Kukiz agents, dark green – agitated Kukiz
agents; grey – neutral agents. Bottom panel: evolution of the
total number of supporters for each party. Orange – PO, dark
blue – PiS, green – Kukiz.
occurred mostly in constituencies which were previously
dominated by PO, while low support was correlated with
the dominance of PiS. The correlation is not perfect – but
it should be noted that while in the model the domains
in Figures 5 and 6 contain almost only the supporters of
a single party, the real constituencies shown in the maps
of Figure 1 always contain some supporters of the local
minority, so even in the PiS-preferring regions of Poland
there are always some PO supporters, who may be the
targets for Mr Kukiz movement.
FIG. 9. A snapshot of the system configuration at T = 1200.
Kukiz support base has replaced most of the PO domains, in
adddition, PiS has gained significantly. The few remaining
PO agents are now in the agitated state.
FIG. 10. Geographical distribution of the support for
Mr Kukiz in the first round of the presidential elections,
May 2015. The highest support is located in some of
the constituencies in which previously PO has enjoyed
the highest popularity (see Figure1). Source: http:
//skuteczneraporty.pl/blog/pawel-kukiz-rozgrzal-pol
ske-na-kogo-zaglosuja-jego-zwolennicy-w-ii-turze/.
B. Effects of the change of newcomer strategy
The “replacement” of PO by the Kukiz party shown
in Figure 8 may be called an ideal strategy for the new
movement. It is however, quite interesting, that due to
lack of experience (and possibly other factors, such as
the difference between the presidential campaign, focus-
9ing on a single personal image and the forthcoming par-
liamentary one, which requires organization and massive
local presence), Mr Kukiz has changed his media strat-
egy. There are many more messages that are perceived as
irrational by the non-supporters, as well as a significant
number of quarrels within the campaign staff, resulting
in demobilizing internal messages as well. The change
has been incorporated into the model via parameter ad-
justment, shown in Table III.
The change in the Kukiz propaganda strategy (or
maybe just its execution?) has disastrous effects to its
popularity. Instead of capturing a large part of the previ-
ous PO support base, the support for Kukiz party stalled
and begun to drop. The new strategy allows PO to regain
some foothold, as shown in recent polls, although at the
“cost” of the fact that almost all its supporters are now in
the agitated state. The possibility of a dialogue between
PiS (which now holds a large and growing majority) and
PO (whose support diminishes (Figure 11) is virtually
impossible due to emotional state their supporters are
in.
By comparing Figures 4 and 11 we could attempt (for
the given set of simulation parameters) to roughly map
the time events of the real world to the Monte Carlo
timeline. The T ∼ 750 would correspond to the be-
ginning of 2015. T = 900 would correspond to end of
May, when Mr Kukiz popularity has reached its peak.
Thus 150 MC steps is about 5 months of real time. The
date of writing this manuscript (July 10th) would corre-
spond to T = 940, well in agreement with the observed
drop in the Kukiz poll figures and the small surge in
PO support. Within this assumptions, the parliamen-
tary elections (scheduled for mid-October) would occur
at T = 1050, leaving Mr Kukiz little chances to gain
significant number of seats. Of course, this prediction
depends very much on the continuation of the current
propaganda strategy. An example of such hypothetical
scenario is presented in Section V B.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Model limitations
We are fully aware of severe limitations of our model,
as an attempt to describe, even qualitatively, a real social
situation.
Firstly, the model does not take into account the ap-
pearance of new voters. Bearing in mind that the young
voters are influenced to a very large extent by their peers
(rather than by their elders), their entry into the electoral
system disturbs it in more way than one. An extension
of the current model aimed at allowing such dynamical
‘flow’ of voters is planned.
Secondly, the voting preferences depend to a large ex-
tent on specific events, such as scandals involving politi-
cians, or even results of football matches. These events
typically have short term effects, but their accumulation
FIG. 11. An example of the evolution of the support for the
three political camps. At T3 = 900 Kukiz party changes its
communication strategy, and in doing so loses its momen-
tum: instead of overpassing PO its support drops back to
zero. Top panel: calm and agitated supporters; orange –
calm PO agents, red – agitated PO agents; light blue – calm
PiS agents, dark blue – agitated PiS agents; light green –
calm Kukiz agents, dark green – agitated Kukiz agents; grey
– neutral agents. Bottom panel: evolution of the total num-
ber of supporters for each party. Orange – PO, dark blue –
PiS, green – Kukiz.
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FIG. 12. A snapshot of the system configuration at T = 1000
in the situation when Kukiz party has changed the strategy
away from optimal. As a result its support has mostly fallen
down. PiS has gained significantly, while PO regained some
presence, however, most of its supporters are now in the agi-
tated state.
may shift the balance more permanently. Of course, the
model does not contain such events and their effects.
Moreover, the assumed asymmetry in the propaganda
(only calm messages for PO, only aggressive messages
from PiS) does not correspond to reality. In particular,
the PO communications strategy contains some admix-
ture of messages promoting fear of what would happen
should PiS come into power. These messages, while fewer
in number and visibility, were always present, and may
serve to strengthen the resolve of the PO electoral base.
Thirdly, the model allows tremendous flexibility in the
choice of the initial parameters for the simulations. It is
very difficult to decide which set would correspond best
to the observations. This limitation includes also the
time dependence: there is no specific way to map the
time measured in Monte Carlo steps to years or weeks.
Lastly, the model focuses on just three parties, while
the actual situation is much more complex. As may be
seen from Figure 2 until the end of 2014 the summed
popularity of the “minor” parties (TR, SLD, PSL) ex-
ceeded the difference between PO and PiS, so that these
parties could aspire to tip the scales in the political situ-
ation – a role quite successfully performed by PSL as PO
coalition partner. Moreover, the model does not take into
account the existence of inflexible supporters for the vari-
ous parties, assuming that in principle all agents are free
to change their sympathies. The introduction of small
groups of die-hard supporters would change the quanti-
tative results of the model.
FIG. 13. An example of the evolution of the support for
the three political camps, when PO takes corrective action at
T4 = 1000. Top panel: calm and agitated supporters; orange
– calm PO agents, red – agitated PO agents; light blue –
calm PiS agents, dark blue – agitated PiS agents; light green
– calm Kukiz agents, dark green – agitated Kukiz agents; grey
– neutral agents. Bottom panel: evolution of the total number
of supporters for each party. Orange – PO, dark blue – PiS,
green – Kukiz.
B. Qualitative discussion of possible future trends
Despite the problems mentioned above, the model,
through a simple action of taking into account the asym-
metry of communication strategies of the two dominant
parties, reproduces the recent shift in the Polish politics
surprisingly well.
It is quite interesting to note that an additional sup-
port for the model may be derived from the fate of the
Ruch Palikota/ Twoj Ruch (TR) party. This party was
formed before the elections in 2011, by a prominent mem-
ber of PO, Mr Janusz Palikot. It has very quickly gath-
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ered sizable support, as shown in Figure 2. In the 2011
parliamentary elections it became the third power, sur-
passing both PSL and SLD, and gathering 10.02% of the
votes. These votes were mostly from previous supporters
of PO. In fact the evolution of PO, PiS and TR support
in 2011–2014 strongly resembles the shape shown by the
model simulations. TR success is accompanied by the fall
in PO popularity and growth in support of PiS. In fact,
the geography of support for TR in the 2011 parliamen-
tary elections follows the same pattern as the one men-
tioned in connection with Mr Kukiz in Figure 10, that
is the highest popularity was achieved in some regions
previously dominated by PO, while the gains were the
weakest in the regions dominated by PiS. The similarity
between the two parties rests largely on their dependence
on the strong personalities of their leaders. It is quite in-
teresting that for both parties it is possible to use as the
trends (in Figures 2 and 4) the same form of the fitting
function A exp(−(T − T0)/τ2)/(1 + exp(−(T − T0)/τ1),
being a combination of logistic growth with the speed
dictated by τ1 and exponential decay, with the speed dic-
tated by τ2. The best fit values of these growth/decay
times are, respectively τ1 = 0.04 year and τ2 = 0.071
year for Kukiz party (although the latter value is ob-
tained from just a few data points), and τ1 = 0.081 year
and τ2 = 1.83 year for TR.
The lack of total fall of PO support due to the appear-
ance of TR on the scene and the subsequent upturn of
its rankings may be attributed to the shift in the party
political strategy, taking a decidedly left turn, and to the
personal success of Mr Tusk, in his election to the post
of the President of the European Council. The success
of the shift towards the left was made possible by to-
tally chaotic management of the social-democratic party
(SLD), which has lost almost 10% points, mostly moving
to the PO base. With respect to the current threat posed
to PO by Mr Kukiz movement, we note that the scale of
the intrusion is almost two times higher, and that there
are no more such “reserves” – the minority parties are
already reduced to the single figure die-hard core elec-
torates, and thus there is no place left for another policy
shift for PO.
It may be worthwhile to discuss the long term trends
leading to PiS overall domination, visible in all both Fig-
ures 8 and 11. They are due to total emotional mo-
bilization of the PiS supporters thanks to the barrage
of aggressive media messages. Still, should PiS win the
upcoming elections (and thus have both the presiden-
tial power and the parliamentary and government one)
at some point or another this success would have to be
reflected in the communication strategy. After the ini-
tial period of blaming everything on the previous incom-
petent PO-led government, one would expect a grow-
ing admixture of self-promoting success stories. Thus a
growing part of the PiS electorate would become calm —
and therefore open to arguments by any upcoming party
(for example social-democratic left, which was quite weak
since 2007). On the other hand, it is possible to attain
90% support or higher by relying on agitation rising pro-
paganda. One way of maintaining this as a long term
strategy is to shift the social attention and to focus it
on external enemies. Such approach is being used, with
huge success by the Russian leader, who, despite the in-
creasingly bad economic situation, enjoys very strong and
stable support (remaining steady at the 60%–70% range
during the period between 2011 and 2014, and jumping
up to over 80% since the Russian invasion of Ukraine).
We remind here that the focus on external enemies as a
binding force is not a uniquely Russian recipe – it has
been used by rulers in many countries and in many his-
torical epochs. So, it could also offer a possibility as a
long-term PiS strategy for total dominance.
The model allows us even to consider some specula-
tions about the future strategies. Suppose that the re-
action to the PiS successes would be a complete change
of communications strategy of PO — moving away from
the calming messages of ‘warm water in the tap’ and ‘Eu-
rope’s green island’ and towards the scary stories of the
horrors that the coming PiS led government will bring.
Such shift is already beginning to occur in reality. These
agitating messages would be addressed not at the PiS
voters (whom it is impossible to convert) but at the PO
own support base, turning it from the calm to the agi-
tated state. If successful, such change would make the
PO supporters immune to the PiS advances and create
another stable equilibrium. Depending on the effective-
ness of the campaign and on the time T4 at which it is
started, the resulting political landscape would contain
a different ratio of PiS and PO supporters. An example
of such evolution of the system is presented in Figure 13.
Propaganda ratios are in Table IV.
While the solution described above preserves politi-
cal plurality, it has a definite drawback: practically all
agents in the system are in agitated states, unable do ra-
tionally process any arguments contrary to their current
beliefs. The polarization becomes a permanent feature
of the system, possibly leading to increased levels of mis-
understanding, conflict and even violence. Such shift to-
wards increased levels of animosity and polarization has
been noted in American politics (see, for example, [37–
39]). Unfortunately, our model suggests that Poland is
heading either for a situation in which the government is
dominated by a single party (with an initially a strong,
negative agenda), or for a system with increased polar-
ization without hope for a consensus. Of course, real life
may hold some surprises, and the predictions described
above may be undermined by its weaknesses mentioned
in section V A.
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Appendix: List of propaganda ratios
The values of the simulation parameters governing the
propaganda streams of each party were chosen in a way to
reproduce qualitatively the observations (up to July 10th,
2015). At the same time they correspond qualitatively
to the ratios of various types of communications in the
real world (as perceived by the author of the paper).
Type of message Relative ratio
PO internal mobilizing 0.0
PO internal demobilizing 0.1
PO external rational 0.25
PO external irrational 0.0
Total PO 0.35
PiS internal mobilizing 0.4
PiS internal demobilizing 0.0
PiS external rational 0.0
PiS external irrational 0.05
Total PiS 0.45
TABLE I. Propaganda types ratios for T between T1 = 200
and T2 = 800.
Type of message Relative ratio
PO internal mobilizing 0.0
PO internal demobilizing 0.07
PO external rational 0.18
PO external irrational 0.0
Total PO 0.25
PiS internal mobilizing 0.25
PiS internal demobilizing 0.0
PiS external rational 0.05
PiS external irrational 0.05
Total PiS 0.35
Kukiz internal mobilizing 0.1
Kukiz internal demobilizing 0.0
Kukiz external rational 0.05
Kukiz external irrational 0.05
Total Kukiz 0.20
TABLE II. Propaganda types ratios for T after the appear-
ance of Kukiz party at T2 = 800.
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Type of message Relative ratio
PO internal mobilizing 0.0
PO internal demobilizing 0.07
PO external rational 0.18
PO external irrational 0.0
Total PO 0.25
PiS internal mobilizing 0.25
PiS internal demobilizing 0.0
PiS external rational 0.05
PiS external irrational 0.05
Total PiS 0.35
Kukiz internal mobilizing 0.05
Kukiz internal demobilizing 0.05
Kukiz external rational 0.0
Kukiz external irrational 0.10
Total Kukiz 0.20
TABLE III. Propaganda types ratios for T after the change
of Kukiz party communication strategy at T3 = 900, when
more demobilizing and irrational messages appear in their
propaganda.
Type of message Relative ratio
PO internal mobilizing 0.1
PO internal demobilizing 0.0
PO external rational 0.15
PO external irrational 0.0
Total PO 0.25
PiS internal mobilizing 0.25
PiS internal demobilizing 0.0
PiS external rational 0.05
PiS external irrational 0.05
Total PiS 0.35
Kukiz internal mobilizing 0.05
Kukiz internal demobilizing 0.05
Kukiz external rational 0.0
Kukiz external irrational 0.10
Total Kukiz 0.20
TABLE IV. Propaganda types ratios for T after the hypo-
thetical change of PO communication strategy at T4 = 1000,
when the demobilizing messages are dropped out and replaced
by mobilizing ones.
